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Equality and Private Choice: 
Reproductive Laws for the 1990s. Edited by Nadine 
Taub* and Sherrill Cohen** (Humana Press 1989). 
Reviewed by Anita L. Allen*** 
Introduction 
Reproductive Laws for the 1990s is a collection of essays, position 
papers, and commentaries about the future of American law relating to 
women and reproduction . Aimed at policy-makers and scholars, this 
book surveys a range of reproductive concerns from feminist, main-
stream and minority perspectives. Patient readers - the book is nearly 
500 pages long - are thus rewarded with an overview of the realities 
and aspirations of contemporary public policy relating to pregnancy 
and childbirth. A three-year collaborative effort, Reproductive Laws 
for the 1990s is the product of the Project on Reproductive Laws for 
the 1990s (the Project). The focus of the Project was twofold. First, it 
examined how society ought best to respond to "questions raised by 
reported advances in reproductive and neonatal technology and new 
modes of reproduction." Second, it considered how society can ensure 
that those shaping reproductive law and policy appreciate the "ramifi-
cations of these developments for gender equality."1 
The Project's Working Group consisted of twenty-five activists, 
physicians, lawyers and social scientists from around the country with a 
common commitment to reproductive freedom and gender equality. Po-
sition papers prepared by members of the Working Group form the 
core of this book. Their papers address six areas of particular current 
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I. REPRODUCTivE LAws FOR THE 1990s v (N. Taub & S. Cohen eds. 1989) 
[hereinafter REPRODUCTIVE LAWS]. 
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concern: (1) time limits on abortion; (2) prenatal screening; (3) the 
fetus as a person; (4) reproductive hazards in the workplace; (5) inter-
ference with reproductive choice; and, (6) alternative modes of 
reproduction. 2 
The position papers, which contain concrete policy and legislative 
proposals, are accompanied by the critical commentaries of outside ex-
perts. Not all of the commentators share the Working Group's view of 
the best reproductive policies and policy implementation strategies. To 
relate the Working Group's concerns to the experiences of poor, minor-
ity and disabled women, two background essays were commissioned. 
Among the book's most refreshing and informative contributions, these 
essays explain that full reproductive freedom for all women requires 
fundamental economic and attitudinal changes in American society. 
Too many pages would be required to assess all of the facts, argu-
ments and legislative materials amassed in this book. I have settled for 
a review of some of the major policy perspectives set out in the back-
ground essays and seven position papers, preceded by a general charac-
terization of the book's overall point of view. 
I. The Point of View 
The editors' preface and an introductory chapter announce a femi-
nist point of view that also serves as the book's refrain: full reproduc-
tive freedom, conceived as the ability to determine if, when, and how 
they will bear children, is women's key to social, economic and political 
equality. 3 The position papers persuasively argue what is commonly ig-
nored but seldom denied, namely, that reproductive privacy for women 
is circumscribed by economic conditions, by the health care delivery 
system, by legal norms, and by attitudes about gender, race and disa-
bility.4 More controversial than the Working Group members' attempts 
to situate reproductive decision-making in its social contexts, are their 
perspectives on what steps private and governmental actors may legiti-
mately take to effectuate or constrain women's autonomous reproduc-
tive choices. 
The position papers have a point of view that is deeply egalitarian, 
as well as feminist. Social, including economic, equality is offered as 
part of a policy-objective trio that also includes the more distinctly 
2. !d. at 4. 
3. !d. at 5. 
4. !d. at 6. 
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feminist goals of reproductive freedom and gender equality. R ather 
than on the concept of equality's ideal articulation and philosophical 
defense, this work focuses on the practical implementa tion of roughed-
out notions of equality. Detailed theories of social and gender equality 
are absent. The position papers are noncommittal on the currently de-
bated questions of sexual equa lity, gender and " difference," such as 
whether sex and gender can be meaningfully distinguished, whether 
laws should be premised on an assumption that men and women are 
different , and whether women can insist upon both sexua l difference 
and sexual equality. 
Notwithstanding the absence of sustained theoretical analysis, it is 
usually plain enough from these papers what their authors believe is 
most consistent with female equality. In particular, it is plain that they 
support reallocation of social resources through publicly-funded pro-
grams designed to make reproductive choice meaningful for all. Con-
cern for the impact of alternative allocations of social resources on tra-
ditionally disadvantaged groups is rarely out of view in the volume's 
major papers and essays. As a means to achieving the paramount ends 
of social equality, gender parity and reproductive freedom, the Work-
ing Group advocated a national health plan and broad, democratic ac-
cess to the best medical care. 5 While Reproductive Laws for the 1990s 
proposed these and other general solutions to the problems of inequality 
and ineffective choice, its editors conceded that the Working Group 
"identified more agonizing questions than clear-cut solutions. " 6 
The book's selection of contributing policy-makers is in harmony 
with its otherwise egalitarian tone. For example, New York State At-
torney General Robert Abrams offers brief commentary describing his 
state's efforts to protect women's reproductive choices by limiting regu-
latory interference and providing public funding for a wide array of 
reproductive services. Some contributors are openly critical of the Rea-
gan Administration and the conservative political forces that oppose, 
for example, national health insurance and public funding for elective 
abortions. Not the least of these is George Miller, the Democratic 
Chairman of the House Select Committee on Children, Youth and 
Families . 
In a chapter entitled, "Reproduction and Access to Health Care: 
A Legislator's View," Congressman Miller argues for preventive inter-
vention as a budget savings mechanism in an era of deficit reduction. 
5. !d. at 10. 
6. !d. at 10. 
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But Miller's apparent concern is not limited to the national budget. He 
decries what he characterizes as the avoidable tragedy that "we have 
not established a legal right to a healthy baby, to adequate nutrition, 
or to proper health care."' Mr. Miller blames the Reagan Administra-
tion for having proposed cuts on health services programs for the poor , 
and for obstructing legislative efforts to eliminate reproductive hazards 
in the workplace. Describing the response of the political structure to 
reproductive needs as "ignorant," "malicious" and requiring change,8 
Miller calls for a national commitment to provide a guarantee of full 
access to quality reproductive health care in the next five years. 
Reproductive Laws for the 1990s largely consists of papers written 
by feminists from a liberal perspective. These papers are not written 
"in a different voice." That is, the contributors seldom appeal explicitly 
to a ffi.liative and caretaking values Carol Gilligan associates with 
women's moral sensibilities. 9 Reproductive policy choices are not de-
picted as a working out of competing contextual responsibilities. In-
stead, in the language of individual rights and justice, and for the sake 
of autonomy and control, they stress the "trade-off between maximiz-
ing individual reproductive autonomy and allocating s.ocietal resources 
in an equitable way."10 Thus, this book emphasizes the ideal of effec-
tive, autonomous, non-governmental choice and, in that complex sense, 
women's reproductive privacy.u Can women's reproductive privacy be 
reconciled with feminine and communitarian values? The policies this 
book advances in the name of individual privacy and equality are more 
than a little consistent with compelling schemes of caretaking and 
affilia tion. 12 
7. /d . at 15. 
8. !d. at 17. 
9. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PsY CHOLOGI CAL THEORY AND 
W OME!\'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) . 
10. REPRODUCTIVE LAws, supra note I, at I 0. 
ll. Cf. Allen, Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. 
L R Ev 46 i, 463-6 (1987) (explaining the sense in which reproductive liberty and au-
tonom y is a form of privacy). 
12. See A. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN I N A fREE SOCIETY 
75 (19 88 ) (;ejecting view that privacy is antithetical to women 's values). 
1989] Allen 629 
II. The Policy Perspectives 
A. Poor, Minority and Disabled Women 
Background essays by Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson and Adrienne Asch 
consider the implications of reproductive policy for poor women, 
women of color, and women with physical or mental disabilities. Nsiah-
Jefferson begins "Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low In-
come Women," warning that there is a lack of precise data on the re-
productive status of individual groups of non-white women. However, 
she subsequently marshalls a battalion of useful facts, many of which 
are not widely known. Asch's more philosophical essay, "Reproductive 
Technology and Disability," is an arresting challenge to conventional 
attitudes about disability, and is supplemented by an extensive bibliog-
raphy of social science and legal materials. 
As discussed below, two of Asch's policy recommendations on be-
half of the disabled - the deemphasis of prenatal screening and pro-
motion of surrogate parenting - are in direct opposition to policy rec-
ommendations made by Nsiah-Jefferson on behalf of poor and ethnic 
minority women. Several conclusions, some obvious, should be drawn 
from the observation of conflicting policy preferences between disabled 
and ethnic minority feminists. To start, feminists will not always agree 
about what policies are most consistent with achieving privacy and 
equality. Moreover, feminists who are members of one disadvantaged 
group will not always agree with feminists who are members of another 
about optimal policy. Thus, middle-class white feminists who seek to 
incorporate the policy preferences of poor, minority and disabled 
women into their own policy proposals, must understand the nature of 
that aspiration. 
The aspiration is not, because it cannot be, to listen to other 
groups and then to make policy proposals that represent the combined 
uncompromised policy preferences of all groups. Formulating egalita-
rian feminist policy proposals is not an additive process - adding "di-
versity" policy preferences onto a list of "majority" policy preferences. 
Rather, it is an ethical and political process in which cooperating advo-
cates must be prepared to defend conceptions of which and whose in-
terests are most pressing, and which and whose interests ought to be 
subject to greatest compromise. The aspiration of middle-class white 
feminists who seek minority perspectives must therefore be to engage 
other groups in inherently ethical and political exchanges. 
Perhaps this is why I found it unsettling that the articles by Asch 
and Nsiah-Jefferson were separately commissioned as "background es-
630 Nova Law Review [Vol. 13 
says." The " background essay" treatment seems to presuppose that the 
policy perspectives of ethnic minority and disabled women are merely 
factual , or worse, merely expressive and therefore not open to dispute . 
This misimpression was furthered by the publication of the "back-
ground essays" without the critical commentary that followed each 
"position paper." 
1. Poor Women and Women of Color 
R eproductive rights have been won under the legal banner of con-
stitutional "privacy" and the activist banner of "choice." Yet, as 
Nsiah-Jefferson explains, when compared to middle-class white women, 
women of color and poor women have had little meaningful decisional 
privacy and many fewer meaningful choices. Moreover, black, hispanic 
and asian/ pacific women have not always had access to the organized 
pro-choice movement. Nsiah-Jefferson concludes that to create the pos-
sibility of meaningful reproductive choice, poor and minority women 
will require greater access to health services and information about 
them, a greater ability to give informed consent or informed refusal, 
access to financial resources, and, an end to discrimination on the basis 
of race and class. 13 
According to Nsiah-Jefferson, in a number of areas, the respects in 
which the experiences of white and non-white women differ has not 
been adequately recognized in the formulation of public policy. Infertil-
ity and sterility is one such area. Studies show that black women have 
a substantially higher incidence of infertility and sterility than white 
women. Sterility caused by untreated pelvic inflammatory disease, sex-
ually transmitted disease, and surgical abuses has been a major health 
and social problem for black women. Some physicians have reportedly 
sterilized black women as a routine incident to obstetrical services 
without first obtaining informed consent. 
Because of the high rate of female infertility and sterility in the 
black community, Nsiah-Jefferson argued, new reproductive technolo-
gies should be widely available and non-traditional conceptions of the 
family embraced . In making this argument, she was fully mindful of 
the economic and ethical difficulties . Without public funding, the group 
of women whose need for new technology-based infertility and sterility 
services is greatest is least able to afford them. Moreover, at least one 
of the alternative methods of reproduction under discussion today , sur-
13. REPRODUCTIVE LAWS, supra note l, at 24. 
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rogate motherhood, is of doubtful justice. 1t threatens to commercialize 
the wombs of poor women. 
Just as the unavailability of infertility and sterility services would 
have great negative impact on women of color, so too would criminal-
ization of second- and third-trimester abortions. Because public abor-
tion funding is not available in many states, poor and minority women 
delay abortions until they can save or raise money to pay for them. 
Moreover, the teenage pregnancy rates among blacks is high and stud-
ies show that teenagers are slower than their adult counterparts to dis-
cover and grapple with their pregnancies. 
Nsiah-Jefferson reported that the problem of reproductive hazards 
in the workplace has_ a particularly strong adverse impact on poor 
women and women of color. M any of these women are employed at low 
paying jobs where the risk of exposure to reproductive and other health 
hazards is most severe, for example in the health, textile, laundry and 
cleaning industries. Legislation designed to require that employers 
make workplaces safe for all workers would thus be of particular bene-
fit to poor women and women of color. So too would policies assuring 
confidentiality in HIV antibody testing for the AIDS virus. Women of 
color are represented in disproportionately high numbers among women 
infected with the AIDS virus. So that they can make timely health 
decisions concerning partners, off-spring, and themselves, women of 
color should be encouraged to obtain tests. The promise of confidential-
ity would help to ensure that women for whom the risk of infection is 
statistically highest are not afraid to be tested out of concern for their 
livelihoods and relationships. 
On a different score, Nsiah-Jefferson argues that there should be 
public funding for prenatal screening and genetic counseling so that 
poor and minority women, like middle-class whites, are able to obtain 
and take advantage of information about any abnormalities in potential 
off-spring. Genetic counseling, she urges, should be conducted in a way 
that crosses the inevitable communication barriers between experts and 
their less affluent and educated patients. 14 These equality arguments 
for increased access to prenatal screening and counseling are persua-
sive, but they are in tension with Adrienne Asch's argument that 
women of all races and classes should deemphasize prenatal screening 
to promote the equality of disabled people. 
14. !d. at 32-34. 
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2. \Vomen with Disabilities 
Adrienne Asch's background essay is about two rather different 
things. It is about whether people with disabilities should be parents , to 
which Asch answers a resounding "yes." It is also about whether efforts 
should be made through prenatal screening to "weed out" disabled 
children. To this, Asch's firm, but controversial answer is "no." Asch's 
view is that pregnant women should not, as a matter of course, abort 
fetuses destined for disablity. (She makes an exception for cases so se-
vere that lives are bound to be very short and painful.) Moreover , Asch 
believes parents should not be reproved for bringing disabled children 
into the world. Her central message brings together concerns about 
parenting the disabled and disabled parents: disabled people are people 
too. They should be given a chance to enjoy life to the fullest extent 
possible, which includes growing up to have families of their own. 
Asch makes a strong case. She starts by emphasizing that, al-
though disability is perceived as abnormal, it is more "normal" than 
many might suppose. A full fifteen percent of the population is dis-
abled. (Asch defines disability broadly to include such diverse condi-
tions as paraplegia, blindness, deafness, mental retardation, and a his-
tory of psychiatric disorder.) Five percent of women of reproductive 
age have disabilities that biologically or socially constrain their repro-
ductive choices. 
Asch proposes a shift in attitude away from what she calls the 
"medical model" of disability to the "minority group model." Disabil-
ity, which she describes as "socially constructed," is too often viewed as 
sickness, giving rise to paternalistic objections to parenting. Because 
disability is a socially constructed category, those suffering with disa-
bilities should be viewed as a kind of "suspect class," that is, as persons 
likely to be wrongfully discriminated against on arbitrary grounds. The 
medical model of disability supports presumptions of parental incompe-
tence. On the other hand, the minority group model eschews the incom-
petence presumption as prima facie discrimination, and asks those who 
would constrain the parenting choice of the disabled to exercise the 
greatest scrutiny and come forward with compelling reasons. In making 
this proposal, Asch seems mainly concerned with changing how society 
thinks about disability. So, for example, she does not recommend 
changing the law so that parents could no longer choose to abort fe-
tuses suspected of disability. She admits there may be valid reasons for 
individual women and families to end a pregnancy on account of fetal 
disability. 
Asch thoughtfully explores the nature of parental dreams for their 
I 
I 
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children and suggests that we should view disability in the same light 
that we view other problems our children face, problems of which we 
are tolerant. She writes that: 
The argument that a woman's only realistic decision is to abort a 
fetus with a disability until society is more willing to include dis-
abled people is at firs t powerful, persuasive, and mindful of the toll 
disabili ty takes on families . It loses some force, however, when we 
consider that women of color bring children into the world even 
knowing that their children will grow up in a racist soc iety and 
may su ffer . .. as a result. 15 
This is an intriguing, but ineffective, analogy. 
The collective alternative of black parents to bringing black chil-
dren into the world is genocide. Expectant mothers of black children 
can expect that their children will have every endowment of body and 
mind human beings can have to cope with hostility. This is not the 
expectation of mothers of disabled children, whether black, brown, red, 
yeilow or white. Disabled children are perceived as having to cope with 
the limitations of their own bodies or minds, as well as a hostile world. 
Aborting children because of their race is virtually diabolical; aborting 
children because of disability or illness is something compassionate ex-
pectant mothers of any race may contemplate. It does not help Asch's 
effort to persuade readers that the disabled are equally deserving of life 
to suggest that disabled children are anticipated by their parents in 
precisely the same way that children of color are anticipated by theirs. 
Asch is ambivalent about new reproductive technologies. She views 
prenatal screening for disability diagnosis as a powerfully symbolic re-
jection of disabled people. Asch believes it is self-deceptive to abort the 
disabled "for their own good," and immoral to abort because of the 
costs that care of the disabled imposes upon society. As noted, Asch's 
opposition to prenatal screening and genetic counseling premised on the 
need to a bort the disabled is in tension with Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson's 
call for greater access to and public funding of prenatal screening and 
genetic counseling for women of color. 
Asch's views on surrogate parenting also pull in an opposite direc-
tion. Asch praises surrogate parenting as a potentially valuable service 
that should be available to disabled women who would like to have 
biologically related children but who cannot manage sexual intercourse 
15. !d . at 85-86 . 
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or the stress of pregnancy and childbirth. In theory, the infertility and 
sterility problems of black women make them candidates for surrogacy 
services as well. But, Nsiah-Jefferson and others fear mounting the 
slippery slope toward new, exploitive uses of poor and minority women. 
Asch's precise stance on nonconsensual pregnancy intervention on 
behalf of the unborn cannot be gleaned from her general remarks on 
the subject. However, unlike other feminist contributors to this book, it 
appears that Asch would support a policy under which the autonomy of 
pregnant women could be sacrificed to prevent or treat a disability that 
could not be effectively treated postnatally. Asch is in accord with the 
others , however, on the question of the legitimacy of "wrongful birth" 
and "wrongful life" tort actions. She argues that there is good reason 
both to fear wrongful birth suits brought against health care providers 
and to oppose suits for wrongful life brought against parents. Both send 
disabled children a message that their existence is something to be 
deeply sorry about. In addition, wrongful life actions penalize parents 
for the noble act of parenting disabled children. 
B. Late-term Abortion 
Nan D. Hunter's "Time Limits on Abortion" reviews abortion law 
since Roe v. Wade. 16 Under Roe, a woman's choice to a medically safe 
abortion is constitutionally protected. In the first trimester of preg-
nancy, her private decision to abort is not subject to state prohibition or 
constraint. In the second trimester, states may limit abortion choice for 
reasons of maternal health. In the third trimester of pregnancy, states 
may interfere with abortion choice to protect the life of a "viable" fe-
tus.17 Hunter argues that viability, now placed at between 24 and 28 
weeks of pregnancy, is an unstable, vague concept. 18 She joins many 
others who view viability as a medically, morally or logically inade-
quate basis for time limits on abortion. 
Hunter favors abandoning the viability standard. Despite "policy 
tensions inherent in late abortion," relating to the personhood status of 
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
17. I d. at J 63 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in 
the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point ... is at . . . the end of the first 
trimester ... With respect to the State's important and legitimate interests in potential 
life, the 'compelling' point is at viability."). 
J 8. Cf. Grimes, Second- Trimester Abortion in the United States, 16 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSP. 260, 264 (1984) (date at which fetus likely to survive inexact). 
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the fetus, Hunter supports an unlimited a bortion right for all women. 19 
Utilizing legal case analysis, she argues tha t the abortion privacy doc-
trine relied on by the Supreme Court is based on principles of both 
bodily integrity a nd personal autonomy. It is an "awesome degradation 
of the self' she concludes, to force parenthood on a person against her 
will. 20 The better policy is one currently followed in the majority of 
states that decline to regula te post-viability abortions. 
In that spirit, Hunter proposed an unlimited abortion right statute, 
providing that " [t]he state sha ll not compel any woman to complete or 
to terminate a pregnancy, nor shall the sta te restrict the use of medi-
cally appropriate methods of abortions." 21 Hunter predicted that such a 
statute would not increase the number of late-term a bortions , which 
are in a ny case uncommon a nd generally sought for very good reaso ns. 
She argued that the policy goa l of reducing late-term abort ion could be 
achieved more humanely by alteration of the social conditions that give 
rise to them, than by blanket prohibition. 22 
Hunter's perspective that the viability criterion is unstable, and 
that an unlimited abortion right is a better alternative, will be ap-
plauded in some quarters. However, her response to the question of the 
appropriate level of concern for the fetus is unsatisfying. She appears to 
side-step familiar fetus-as-person and fetus-as-patient arguments like 
those raised by her critics in this volume. Hunter's general response 
was vague: "The question of how the law should treat post-viability 
abortions requires a balancing of harms, interests, and other options. " 23 
More specifically, but somewhat mysteriously, she concluded that the 
potentia l lives of the unborn can be "valued in many ways" and that 
"[t]o compel procreation is more punitive than respectful of the genera-
tive process."24 
C. Prenatal Screening 
In their position paper, "Prenatal Screening," Mary Sue Henifin, 
Ruth Hubbard and Judy No:-sigian presented an overview of legal con-
straints on prenatal screening. 1 hey concluded that, although standard 
19. REPRODUCTIVE LAWS, supra note I, at 146. 
20. !d. at 145. 
21. !d. at 148. 
22. !d. at 147. 
23. !d. at 147. 
24. !d. at 147. 
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prena tal tests and counselling should be available to a ll women who 
want them irrespective of their ability to pay, manda tory testing is 
countermanded by constitutional privacy rights and common law rights 
to bodil y integrity. The authors rejected the conception of pregna nt 
women that singles them out and places them in a spec ial category 
enabling justified state control of their bodies or fetuses. 
The availability of prenatal screening rai sed the specter of liabiii ty 
for " genetic" injury. Notwithstanding women's lega l righ ts of choice, is 
there a lega l duty to screen and abort , or to pay civil damages in 
wrongful life actions brought by their own disabled offspring? These 
authors viewed cases allowing children to recover for prena tal injury as 
dangerous precedents, grounded in the assumption that women 's role is 
that of "feta l container."25 Asch opposed sui ts of thi s type as well, but 
primaril y in the name of respect for the worth of disabled persons 
ra ther than women's rights of private choice and bodily integrity. 
To stem the tide of maternal liability for genetic injury (and pre-
natal injury resulting from activities that posed health risks to the fe-
tus), the authors proposed a parental immunity sta tute, immunizing 
parents from law suits for conduct during pregnancy. The proposed 
statute was designed to free women from the fear of liability for refusal 
to undergo screening or to take action in reliance upon it. 
Jeannie I. Rosoff's commentary affirmed the thrust of Henifin, 
Hubbard and Norsigian's position paper. Rosoff added caveats against 
utilitarian trade-offs of fundamental rights in reproductive policy. If 
prenatal screening is good maternal care, it should be sought for that 
reason, not because it would set-off other costs .26 Deborah Kaplan 's 
commentary stressed that disabled people must be brought into the pre-
natal screening debate. She asked how it is possible to "talk about or 
take advantage of prenatal screening without further stigmatizing dis-
abled people."27 Arguing from the point of view of a personal injury 
lawyer who has become critical of wrcngful life actions, she contended, 
along the lines of Asch, that these suits further the stereotype tha t the 
lives of disabled persons a re hopeless. 
25. !d. a t 173. 
26. !d. a t 240. 
27. !d. a t 245. 
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D . Fetus as Person 
Janet Gallagher's position paper surveys legal cases and social at-
titudes about the personhood status of the fetus. She seeks to discredit 
the notion that women's autonomy should be sacrificed for fetal well-
being. The treatment of women as vessels, and fetuses as persons and 
pa tients, reflects society's elevation of the fetus as a "symbol of hope 
a nd fear." 28 Gallagher's seemingly exhaustive paper is supplemented 
with model jury instructions and a detailed legal case commentary 
appendix. 
According to Gallagher, legal cases and proposals upholding "fetal 
rights fly in the face of what has become a very consistent, powerful 
trend in American law, " namely, "protection for individual rights of 
personal autonomy and bodily integrity, especially in the area of medi-
cal decision making."29 She attacks those intent upon making women 
and physicians liable in criminal and tort law for fetal injury. Liability 
is wrongheaded for a number of reasons. First, pregnant women rarely 
refuse beneficial medical treatment. Second, in the face of medical un-
certainty, women are being subjected to too many caesarian section de-
liveries. Caesareans allow physicians who fear liability for injuries sus-
tained by the infant during vaginal birth to exercise greater control 
over delivery. Gallagher believes women should have a right to carry 
and bear their children "with dignity," on their own terms. 30 Third, 
while it is unfortunate that children are born with disabilities , courts 
should be reluctant to hold liable for "prenatal abuse" women to whom 
society does not guarantee medical and prenatal care. 
In his commentary, neonatologist and pediatrician Alan R. 
Fleischman argues that "The Fetus is a Patient." He takes exception to 
views Gallagher and Hunter defend in their respective papers on fetal 
personhood and late-term abortion. Fleishman attempts systematic 
a rgumentation from the moral principles of "respect for person" and 
"beneficence." Constrained by the short-comment format, his effort is 
heavy-handed and unconvincing. 31 
Fleischman too quickly concludes that respect for persons 
" clearly" supports the right of expectant mothers to determine what 
happens to their own bodies and that it less clearly supports the poten-
28. !d. at 188,191. 
29. !d. at 196-97. 
30. !d. at 215. 
31. !d. at 249-50. 
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tial autonomy of the fetus. 32 Yet, moral reasoning in reliance upon 
broadly drawn principles in controversial cases does not yield such de-
terminate results. 
Fleischman's principle of beneficence allegedly requires that a 
physician do what he or she can to maximize possible benefits and min-
imize possible harms. According to Fleischman the beneficence princi-
ple requires the ethical physician to balance mothers' and fetuses' in-
terests to secure their well-being and best interests. 33 This conclusion 
and the manner in which it is reached is puzzling. First, Fleischman 
does not explain the jarring juxtaposition of a respect-for-persons deon-
tological mora lity with the consequentialist interest-maximizing moral-
ity his approach to reproductive ethics purports to incorporate. Second, 
he does not specify what counts as benefits and harms, their relative 
weight, or the sense in which the unborn have interests to be harmed or 
benefited . Third , even assuming that morality requires balancing ma-
ternal and fetal interests in the name of beneficence, it may be that 
pregnant women, and not their physicians, have the moral power to 
effectuate their understanding of what balancing requires. 
Fleischman seems to rely on his beneficence principle to argue that 
a woman has a moral obligation to act in the best interest of her fetus 
to the extent she has voluntarily allowed it to come to term. The facial 
appeal of this point is easily resisted. Of course, women have a moral 
obligation to do the morally best thing. Sometimes that will mean car-
rying a pregnancy to term. It cannot be decided in advance that the 
best thing will always be to focus on preserving the life of a fetus 
rather than securing the conditions of full, happy lives for herself, her 
family and her community. 
Fleischman's moral perspectives are shared in large part by John 
A. Robertson in his commentary, "Reconciling Offspring and Maternal 
Interest During Pregnancy." Robertson is disturbed by the view of the 
position paper authors that "neither a late stage of pregnancy nor a 
decision to go to term justifies limits on the autonomy of pregnant 
women."34 Robertson's stance is that a mother's interest in autonomy 
must be balanced against her baby's welfare. Unlike that of feminists 
who turn to "balancing," his application of the balancing test comes 
down on the side of greater protection for the fetus. 
Robertson believes women should be regarded as having a moral 
32. !d. at 250. 
33. !d. at 250. 
34. !d. at 259. 
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duty to babies they choose to bring to term requmng that they, for 
example, take scrupulous care of their own health. Robertson's duty 
would leave a woman free to abort. But if she does not, her fetus is a 
patient by virtue of the expectation that it will be born alive. 35 In addi-
tion to being a patient , the fetus is also a legal person. Offspring have a 
welfare interest that is properly also a legal interest in being born 
healthy. For this reason, Robertson maintains, women should be legally 
accountable for voluntary conduct leading to prenatal injury to their 
children. As a practical matter, women should not be subjected to pros-
ecution or "seized" during pregnancy. 36 He argued that Gallagher and 
Henifin, Hubbard and Norsigian presented no empirical data or per-
suasive reasons for thinking that prenatal child abuse laws would un-
justly limit the conduct of pregnant women or others to whom they 
would apply. 
In a further defense of fetal personhood, Robertson suggests that 
legal bans on late-term abortions are justifiable. Early abortion, per-
formed before the brain and nervous system have largely taken shape 
and ex utero fetal survival would be possible, is morally less problem-
atic than late-term abortion. He explains that the advanced physiologi-
cal development of the fetus at 22 to 24 weeks corresponds to increased 
moral demands on us. 37 As a moral matter, Robertson urges interven-
tion that lets mature fetuses live on the ground that whatever interests 
pregnant women have in the avoidance of genetic and gestational par-
entage are overridden by needs of the infant. 
E. Workplace Hazards 
The important issues set out by Joan E. Bertin's pos1t10n paper, 
"Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace," will be unfamiliar to many 
readers, even readers who know quite a lot about reproductive ethics 
and law. Bertin argues that many American workplaces pose hazards 
to men, women, and the unborn. Where hazards are recognized or sus-
pected, management response has been to bar women of childbearing 
age and pregnant women from the workplace, wholesale. As a conse-
quence, hundreds and thousands of jobs are closed to women. 38 
Bertin maintains that employers have often ignored reproductive 
35 . !d. at 260. 
36. !d. at 264-65. 
37. !d. at 268. 
38. !d. at 279. 
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hazards men face, while taking the different measure of disqualifying 
from employment fertile women of childbearing age. Sexism in the de-
sign of occupational hazards research has allowed experts to conclude 
that women and fetuses are at greater risk. Epidemiological studies fre-
quentl y fail to control for paternal exposures to hazards. That men's 
genetic material may have an impact on future generations is obvious, 
but men of childbearing age have not been closely studied and have not 
been banned from the workplace. 
Economic equality for all women requires that male and female 
workers be provided a safe workplace and that women not be paterna l-
istically excluded either for their own sakes or for the sake of fetuses 
they may carry. As Bertin observes, women are too often treated as 
childbearers first and workers second. Employers' fetal protection poli-
cies have forced some women to make a choice between fertility and 
their jobs. Women who wish to function in the "male" world have been 
handed surgical sterility as their best economic option, requiring liter-
ally that they sacrifice their uniquely female childbearing capacities.39 
Jeanne Mager Stellman's commentary emphasizing "flawed science 
and poor policies" in the semiconductor industry corroborates Bertin's 
main points. 
Bertin finds nothing in Title VII of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act (Title VII) 40 or the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA)41 indicating Congressional intent to offer pregnant employees 
less or different legal protection than nonpregnant employees. It is thus 
all the more important that the use of exclusionary policies or sterility 
requirements be prohibited. As a remedy, Bertin proposes that Con-
gress clarify the statutory mandates of OSHA and Title VII. She sug-
gests the creation of a private right of action under OSHA. She em-
phasizes the legal principle that discrimination may not be excused 
because of the costs associated with nondiscrimination and offers a 
model "workers' bill of rights," addressing the problem of reproductive 
hazards and employment rights. 
Writing out of their staff experiences with the House Education 
and Labor Committee, Edmund D. Cooke and Sally J. Kenney seem 
convinced of the validity of Bertin's perspectives. Yet, with respect to 
new reproductive hazards legislation designed to protect women work-
ers, Cooke and Kenney maintain that OSHA interest groups may not 
39. !d. a t 278. 
40. 42 U.S.C . § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). 
41. 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
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be responsive to amending the statute. Interest groups will fear opening 
OSHA up to political processes that may result in other changes with 
unforeseen or foreseen negative consequences. Free-standing equal 
safety legisla tion, they suggest, is a better idea. As for Bertin's idea of 
a private right of action, Cooke and Kenney opine that it seems too 
expensive. They recommend instead a quasi-judicial administrative pro-
cess. Cooke and Kenney note that the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission has been sluggish on the reproductive ha za rds and dis-
crimination issue. As practical advice, Cooke and Kenney offer the 
names of members of Congress to whose attention Bertin's proposals 
should be brought. They also offer the general stra tegy that interest 
groups be apprised as soon as possible of her proposa ls. Helen Rodri-
guez-Trias, who believes the reforms Bertin proposes arc sensible and 
feasible, argues that "without forceful trade union involvement and 
pressure" innovative reform is unlikely. 
F. Interference with Decisional Privacy 
In her position paper, "Interference with Reproductive Choice," 
Nancy Gertner covers familiar territory. She argues that "maximizing 
control over reproductive decisions is a prerequisite to fuil equality for 
women."42 Gertner's list of obstacles to reproductive choice includes 
poverty, lack of information, and manipulative state action. The Hyde 
Amendment, which eliminated Medicaid coverage of elective abortions, 
affects the ability of poor women to terminate unwanted pregnancies. 
Denia l of public funds to clinics that offer abortion counselling can be 
expected to constrain poor women's ability to choose. 
Radical anti-abortion tactics such as violent attacks on facilities 
and bogus clinics limit reproductive choices. In a different vein, wife 
beating, assault on pregnant women, and intentional feticide undercut 
women's choices. Unwanted sterilization, especially the di sproportion-
ate sterilization of women of color, limits choice. Poverty and lack of 
information blocks access to new technology designed to cope with in-
fertility. Court-ordered obstetrical interferences for refusal to take 
medical advice also limits reproductive choice. Last, but not least, 
Gertner argues that even the centerpiece of litigation concerned with 
abortion and procrea tive rights - the constitutional right to privacy -
is under considerable attack. She proposes adoption of a comprehensive 
reproductive choice statute, establishing the principle of broad state 
42. REPRODUCTIVE LAWS, supra note 1, at 307. 
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support for reproductive liberty for women. 
Cooke and Kenney were especially critical of Gertner's proposal 
"because the legislative solutions it suggests are complex, and skirt or 
tread on extremely controversial issues."43 They warn that neither the 
public nor Congress deal with such matters very well. Thus while ad-
mitting that the substance of Gertner's proposed reproductive choice 
statute is "validly based and necessary"44 they conclude that real world 
constraints doom her proposal. It would be perceived and debated as an 
abortion bill, irrespective of its broader intent. 
Helen Rodriguez-Trias' comments on Gertner's position paper em-
phasized her concern with measures to curb steril ization abuse, a prob-
lem of disproportionate impact on black and hispanic women. She 
praises Gertner's broad understanding of barriers to choice, but criti-
cizes her proposal for failing to cover the issues of sterilization abuse 
and for failing to elevate prenatal care to the level of a right. 
G. Alternative Forms of Reproduction 
1. New Reproductive Techniques 
In "Alternative Modes of Reproduction," Lori B. Andrews ob-
serves that "the feminist perspective" has received little attention in the 
growing ethical and legal literature on new and newly applied repro-
ductive technologies.45 These technologies include, ( 1) artificial insemi-
nation, (2) in vitro fertilization, (3) sperm, egg, gamete and embryo 
donation, and ( 4) surrogate parenting. 
Andrews' position paper purports to identify the values feminists 
believe must be promoted and protected in the development of laws 
respecting the new reproductive alternatives. These values, she says, 
"ring loud and clear," even where feminists disagree about whether 
and how "these values are threatened by certain applications of alter-
native reproduction. " 46 
But the sound of consensus feminist values is never really heard in 
Andrews' paper. As commentator Peggy Davis points out, Andrews 
overstates her claim to have identified consensus feminist perspectives. 
Andrews' paper identifies her own feminist attitudes and preferences, 
43. !d. at 332. 
44. !d. at 333. 
45. !d. a t 361. 
46. Id. at 362. 
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but not feminist values generally. A charitable reader will infer that, 
while Andrews does not present a distinct, consensus feminist view-
point, the policies she favors appear to be plausible from the point of 
view of defensible conceptions of women's moral and political equality, 
bodily integrity and privacy. 
According to Andrews, feminists believe infertility should be ap-
proached as a social phenomenon and not merely a biological one.47 
That is, policy-makers should seek to determine the causes of wide-
spread infertility and eliminate them. Reducing infertility would reduce 
the need for expensive and controversial alternative modes of reproduc-
tion. Andrews maintains that feminists believe fertile and infertile 
women should have control over their bodies, their gametes and their 
conceptuses; that women not be exploited by their partners, their health 
care providers, and researchers; that alternative reproduction be availa-
ble to traditional and nontraditional family arrangements, and without 
invasive parental screening of the sort that precedes adoption; that re-
productive technology not be needlessly medicalized; and, that public 
and private institutions give financial support to those unable to afford 
alternative reproductive technologies so that every woman can realize 
her birth right to reproduce. According to Andrews, feminists also 
agree that women have a right not to be exploited by physicians, re-
searchers, infertile couples, husbands or lovers. Reproductive materials 
and their handling should be within women's control. Medical treat-
ment should be preceded by informed consent, which includes disclo-
sures of information about known medical risks. 
From the tenet that women have a right to control their bodies, 
Andrews inferred that women have a right to reproduce or not as they 
choose. Moreover, they have a right to a society that addresses the so-
cial problems of infertility, infant death and child care; to the use of in 
vitro fertilization; to control the fates of embryos created in vitro; to 
become surrogate mothers voluntarily, especially if money does not 
change hands and autonomy is preserved during conception and preg-
nancy; and to rely upon a surrogate mother to obtain a child. 
For Andrews, the notion that giving birth is a birthright is clearly 
more than a slogan. She argues, in effect, that the right to give birth is 
not simply a negative right barring state interference with private 
choices to reproduce and parent. It is also a positive right to the social 
and economic requirements of reproducing even in the face of infertil-
47. !d. at 363. 
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ity and a partner's sterility. Thus, not only may the state not interfere 
with the choice to give birth by, for example, imposing involuntary 
sterilization. It must provide the social conditions that foster fertility 
and infant survival rather than infertility and infant mortality. It must 
provide the poor and middle classes with economic access to alternative 
reproductive technologies. 
Regrettably, Andrews takes the social issues ra ised by alternative 
modes of reproduction only so far. Alternative modes of reproduction 
do not exist simply because infertility exists. Alternative modes of re-
production exist because people want - and are willing to pay la rge 
sums of money to have- a certain biological and racia l rel a tionship to 
the children they raise. They want to have contributed genetic materi-
a ls, or failing that, to have selected their child 's biolog ica l pa rentage or 
gestator. Adoption, an old fashioned solution, would be more popular if 
more healthy white babies were available and/or if racial differences 
and disability could be more easily accepted by adoptive parents and 
adoption professionals. 
One of Andrews' more debatable conclusions is that there ought to 
be no screening requirements for people who want to take advantage of 
sperm banks and in vitro fertilization. Interestingly, she supports a rea-
sonable degree of screening of adoptive parents and persons who aid in 
reproduction, such as surrogate mothers and sperm donors. In this con-
nection, she attempted to distinguish adoption screening from screening 
in other contexts: 
In adoption, there is no biological tie between the child and any of 
the prospective parents. Thus, the screening becomes a substitute 
for the biological bond in determining who should be allowed to 
parent a child. In contrast, with alternative reproduction [e.g., in 
vitro fertilization, artificial insemination , and surrogate mother-
hood], there is a biological tie between one or both of the prospec-
tive parents and the child. Traditionally , society has considered 
that biological tie to be a sufficient indicator of parenta l merit to 
let a person reproduce and rear a child without prior constraint. 48 
However, it is a fiction that the capacity to forge biologica l ties sug-
gests parental merit , whereas the desire to create legal and moral ties 
to a child does not. A better account is rooted in society's traditional 
allocation of rights of privacy shielding reproductive acts and home life 
48. !d. a t 375. 
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from governmental scrutiny, until acts which threaten a child's best 
interests become known or reasonably suspected. 
In response to Andrews' proposal that simple new technologies, 
like artificial insemination be demedicalized for lay use, physician Lu-
igi Mastroianni questioned whether risks created by exclusion of a role 
for doctors in alternative reproductive technologies are worth the added 
autonomy. He also discussed the technical problems that arise in efforts 
to protect the fetus in embryo transplants. Mastroianni joined Asch, 
Gallagher, Robertson, and others in asking whether there should be 
legal liability if children are born with disabilities. 
In his commentary to the position papers on alternative modes of 
reproduction, George Annas begins with the assumption that govern-
ment has a greater role to play in the use of new reproductive technolo-
gies than in abortion and contraception. He suggests that policy-makers 
examine new reproductive technologies with a view toward identifying 
their common characteristics relevant to public policy. Tomorrow's in-
evitable new technologies can then be analyzed under today's frame-
work. He offers a clever analytic procedure whereby policy-makers 
would quantify the relative social utility of regulating each method of 
new reproductive technology and its generic importance as a social pol-
icy issue. He admits that the assignments of numerical weights in the 
analysis is impressionistic, but nevertheless maintains its usefulness in 
assessing the worth of regulation relevant to "controlling medical prac-
tice; controlling human experimentation; granting legal protection to 
the extracorporeal embryo; making provisions for donor screening and 
record confidentiality; regulating commerce in gamete and embryos; 
and attaching conditions to the delivery of medical services that are 
paid for by government programs."49 
Annas reports that at the present time there is no federal regula-
tion in these areas, but there is a great deal of state legislation. In the 
course of his survey of actual and ideal legislation, Annas made a num-
ber of specific policy proposals. Interestingly, he proposed that states 
should enact statutes that define a child's gestational mother as its 
mother. (In anticipation of the day when machines may be gestational 
mothers, Annas may need to consider whether women who provide bio-
logic materials should be legally defined as mothers in the absence of a 
human gestator.) On another score, Annas believes Congress should 
amend the National Organ Transplant Act to include human embryos 
49. !d. at 413. 
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among items it is unlawful to sell. 
2. Surrogate Parenting 
Wendy Chavkin, Barbara Katz Rothman and Rayna Rapp offer a 
brief position paper specifically about surrogate motherhood. For rea-
sons they do not explain, their paper is set up as a series of questions 
and answers. The answers they give to the questions they pose reflect a 
sense that "diverse women's interests in pregnancies" are threatened by 
third-party reproduction.~0 
They are thus more skeptical about policies promoting surrogacy 
than Andrews or Asch. They share the fears of Nsiah-Jefferson and 
Annas about letting the camel's nose under the tent. Like Annas, they 
reject the suggestion of some feminists, including Andrews in this vol-
ume,51 that surrogacy contracts should be specifically enforced to avoid 
the assumption that women are fickle. 52 This seems correct. There are 
many good reasons a surrogate might change her mind about so mo-
mentous a matter as giving up a child she has carried pursuant to a 
prenatal agreement. Moreover, legal battles over surrogacy agreements 
must resolve, at the threshold, whether such agreements should be 
treated as specifically enforceable commercial contracts at all, or as 
unenforceable personal commitments.~3 
Peggy Davis argued in commentary that surrogate parenting 
should be permitted to avoid the stagnation of gender roles and defini-
tion. Her idea is that having children should not be limited to the mari-
tal and traditional family context, but be permitted in the commercial 
context as well. Yet, surrogacy is not progressive in the way Davis sug-
gests. Viewed in one light, surrogacy arrangements are not a sharp 
break with tradition. They still involve women having babies to satisfy 
men's or couple's craving for biological descendants. Moreover, there is 
a frank retrogressive overtone of slavery in the idea of creating com-
mercial markets in children that disrecommends surrogacy as a route 
to female liberation. 
Even if surrogate parenting has a future as commercialized 
childbearing, from the point of view of surrogates themselves, the prac-
tice has not yet become that. Surrogate Elizabeth Kane has revealed 
50. ld. at 405 . 
51. ld. at 369. 
52. ld. at 414. 
53. See generally Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. LJ. 
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that she lost rather th an earned money as America's first commercial 
surrogate mother. 54 Jan Sutton, a leading surrogacy advocate, has ex-
plained that compassion for the plight of childless rel a tives and friends, 
rather than the nomin al sums she earned, motivated her twice to be-
come a surrogate mother for strangers. 55 Moreover, Sutton is more sat-
isfied with her second surrogacy experience than the first because a 
continuing friendship with the biological father and adoptive mother 
has enabled her to spend time with her child . There is no inh erent re-
definition of gender roles in a practice that permits low-paid , nurturing 
women like Kane and Sutton to bear children fathered by men to 
whom they are not marr ied. 
Dav is' warning to policy-makers that they keep law and morality 
distinct has unclear implications for surrogacy. Davis asserted that law 
and morality a re potentially confused in policy discuss ions a bout the 
new reproductive technologies. She urged that policy-makers preserve 
the distinction between what is private (properly left to individual mo-
rality) and what is public (properly subject to legal regulation or 
prohibition). 
Davis believes that how society confronts new technologies and al-
ternative methods of reproduction - like surrogacy - should be 
guided by the principle that government should not interfere with genu-
inely private choices. She seems to reject Annas' assumption that more 
state intervention is necessarily required by use of new reproductive 
technologies than is required by the use of contraception and abortion. 
The difficulty, of course, is in defending the policy treatment of repro-
ductive methods which have social and third-party consequences as pri-
vate matters to be left to private decisionmaking and priva te law, 
rather than as public concerns, properly subject to public regulation 
through public law. 
Conclusion 
This book of diverse perspectives is unified by the underlying 
theme of sexual equality through reproductive privacy and social equal-
ity. Reproductive law in its current form satisfies no one's ideal. Willy 
nilly, this book shows that the labels "feminist," "liberal," and "egali-
54. Surrogate mothers Elizabeth Kane and Jan Sutton were featured speakers at 
the Legal Issues Workshop of the American Federation of Planned Parenthood, An-
nual Convention, October 14, 1988, St. Louis, Missouri. 
55. !d. 
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tarian" do not signify consensus on the details of reproductive policy. 
Still, for the major contributors to this volume there are common policy 
imperatives, starting with a national health plan that guarantees rou-
tine medical and prenatal care for all women, workplaces free of repro-
ductive hazards, abortion access, and parental immunity from liability 
for "prenatal abuse" and "wrongful life ." 
This is not a perfect book. First, while useful, not all of the posi-
tion papers are as original and provocative as Asch's paper on the re-
productive rights of the disabled or Gallagher's on fetal personhood . 
Second, the quality of the commentary is uneven. A more tightly edited 
book would have eliminated repetitive and pro forma commentary. 
Third, as my criticisms of Fleischman and Annas suggest , the system-
atic ethica l policy analysis in the book is sketchy, heavy-handed and 
unpersuasive. Finally, incomplete attention is given to problems of pol-
icy implementation and strategies for preserving past legislative and ju-
dicial gains. The stark, if disheartening, policy realism of the book's 
treatment of proposed legislation to address the problem of reproduc-
tive hazards in the workplace would have been helpful throughout. 
Reproductive Laws for the 1990s is not perfect, but its flaws 
barely diminish its practical value for intended audiences. The book 
compiles the thoughts and research of a distinguished group of repro-
ductive policy experts. It conveys a wealth of information about repro-
ductive law in the United States and the factors that shape it. Insisting 
that reproductive policy should not be formulated in ignorance of social 
reality, the book spotlights the implications of reproductive policy on 
the lives of poor, minority and disabled women. Best of all, the book 
provides readers with an organized overview of reproductive law. This 
perspective is not easily obtained, for high-profile issues such as surro-
gate parenthood and abortion often overshadow basic long-term repro-
ductive policy concerns. 
